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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
CA VEA T EMPTOR: A PIERCED SHIELD
BACKGROUND
Caveat emptor-let the buyer beware. In the absence of fraud, this
ancient maxim' is still the rule of law in the sale of realty. Is this rule
indicative of the bargaining ethics of today or is it merely the result of
retarded development in this area of the law?
Even among the most eminent of legal scholars there is discord as to
the position of the doctrine of caveat emptor in the law today. Prosser,
in discussing the doctrine, states that there has been a "complete shift"
away from this point of view, 2 while Pomeroy, a scholar of equal stature,
had but a few years earlier restated the doctrine as the prevailing law.3
It would appear from these two seemingly inconsistent statements that the
rule is not as well defined as stated above. Hence, examination of this
doctrine is necessary, including its origin, its present status, and its future
course of development.
The words themselves smack of some earlier age when each man was
sufficient unto himself and did not seek a court of law to right the wrong
someone had done him. It would seem as if the expression which cannot
be found among any of the presently existing Roman writings, 4 arose dur-
ing the Medieval Age, or at the latest, during the England of the 1400's.
But caveat emptor was not to be found there. It was not a legal doctrine
of this period. "To priest and lord, to yeoman and villein and even to
1 Taken from an article of that name, Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
2 PROSSER, TORTS 552-53 (2d ed. 1955): "The last half-century has seen a marked
change in the attitude of the courts toward the question of justifiable reliance. Earlier
decisions, under the influence of the prevalent doctrine of 'caveat emptor,' laid great
stress upon the plaintiff's 'duty' to protect himself and distrust his antagonist, and
held that he was not entitled to rely even upon positive assertions of fact made by
one with whom he was dealing at arms length. It was assumed that any one may be
expected to overreach another in a bargain if he can, and that only a fool will expect
common honesty. Therefore, the plaintiff must make a reasonable investigation and
form his own judgment. The recognition of a new standard of business ethics, de-
manding that statements of fact be at least honestly and carefully made, and in many
cases that they be warranted to be true, has led to an almost complete shift in this
point of view."
3 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 904 at 558 (Symons, 5th ed. 1951) "In ordi-
nary contracts of sale, where no previous fiduciary relationship exists, and where no
confidence, express or implied, growing out of or connected with the very transaction
itself, is reposed on the vendor, and the parties are dealing with each other at arms'
length, and the purchaser is presumed to have as many opportunities for ascertaining
all the facts as any other person in his place would have had, then the general doctrine
already stated applies: No duty to disclose material facts known to himself rests upon
the vendor; his failure to disclose is not a fraudulent concealment."
4 Comment, 5 DE PAUL L. REv. 263 (1956).
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burgler and lawyer, it would have fallen strangely upon the ear. They
did not talk that language."5 Actually, the institutions of that day and age
were based on the foundation of church and state authority. The ideals
of the period were religiously oriented and a mercantile system of any
extent or importance had not yet developed. One author analyzed the
development of the doctrine in this way:
In early days the church had put its curse upon trade; it was evil, all evil, and
the manner of its conduct did not matter. One who trafficked was beyond its
Christian fellowship. As it became respectable, a petty and disorderly com-
merce grew up beyond the reach of the many arms of mediaeval control.
Away from the marts or organized trade were to be found the wayfaring
palmer with his relics and trinkets, the peripatetic peddler with gew-gaws
and ornaments, strangers here today and there tomorrow, wayfaring men
of no place and without the law.... Among such persons without rank or of
mean estate a redress of wrongs was practically not to be had. It took time
and the bitterness of experience to subdue the idea into compact language;
but here it came to be understood that one's unconsidered bargain was his
own tough luck.
How the trick of phrase was turned, and caveat emptor came into being we
do not know. The wisdom seems to be the afterthought of the good man who
has bargained, perhaps in a horse trade, once too often; the manner suggests
the lawyer regretfully stating that the grievance seems to be without redress.
It has happened often enough that tinkers and butchers and brewers have won
the favor of kings and have then walked unabashed among the nobly born.
Surely a caveat emptor may emerge from the folk thought of the despised
trades and stand without shame before judges as an ancient maxim of the com-
mon law.0
Thus, the proverb emerged in England, but it was the England of the
seventeenth century. It was there also that it developed into a maxim of
the law. But it was the early American courts which truly expanded the
maxim so that by the middle of the nineteenth century, it had become
fully entrenched in the United States as the rule of law pertaining to
sales.7
THE RULE TODAY-EXCEPTIONS
Due, at least in part, to mass production techniques and enormous
growth of business transactions which developed in the last half of the
nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth, legislation was passed
which broke the grip of caveat emptor on the sale of personal property.8
5 Hamilton, supra note I at 1136. RId. at 1162-63.
7In Barnard v. Kellog, 77 U.S. 383, 388-89 (1870), Mr. Justice Davis delivering the
opinion of the court stated: "Of such universal acceptance is the doctrine of caveat
emptor in this country, that the courts of all the States in the Union where the com-
mon law prevails, with one exception (South Carolina) sanction it."
s See generally, The Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.
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In the area of real property, however, where there has been no fraud, the
doctrine still prevails, and mere nondisclosure, not being fraud, is not
actionable.9 Hence, the buyer is stuck with his purchase, which may be
much less than what he thought he was bargaining for, even though the
vendor knew full well what he was selling, but said nothing.
Following the Second World War, there began a tremendous increase
in sales and construction of houses, and mass production techniques began
to be applied to the building of homes. 10 Perhaps it was this growth, and
the increased amount of litigation following it, which acted as a stimulus
for the courts, because they began to turn away from the rule of caveat
emptor and, while continuing to reiterate that caveat emptor was the
existing law, began to formulate numerous exceptions to the rule. Seeking
in each case to balance the equities between the vendor and the purchaser,
the courts would find some reason not to apply the doctrine to the facts
in the particular case before it. With a vast number of cases moving away
from the rule, a body of concrete exceptions to the ancient doctrine was
formed.
It had long been established that acts or conduct, if made with the intent
to deceive, would constitute a misrepresentation." Obviously then, this
would be the most readily available method by which the courts could
grant relief to the buyer. The courts began to seek out misleading state-
ments or actions by the vendor, and where they could be found, they were
considered tantamount to fraud, and therefore, caveat emptor would not
apply. Thus, it was found that the doctrine was not applicable where the
vendor stated the "house was fit for residential purposes," when the fill
soil on the lot was saturated with oil which precluded building a basement
without excessive cost. 2 The same result was reached where the vendor
stated that the house was "well constructed" when, in fact, it was built
on clay sub-soil and the house began to settle.'l It was also a misrepresenta-
tion where the seller revealed true facts but not all of them, 14 a half truth
9 See, e.g., Egan v. Hudson Nut Products Inc., 142 Conn. 344, 114 A.2d 213 (1955);
Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229, 43 A.2d 221 (1945); Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472,
147 A.2d 223 (1958); Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d
808 (1942); Shubert v. Neyer 165 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio App. 1959); Dozier v. Hawthorne
Development Co., 37 Tenn. App. 279, 262 S.W. 2d 705 (1953).
10 The value of yearly construction of private residential buildings was $200,000,000
annually in 1945 compared to about $15,000,000,000 in 1950, and about $18,000,000,000
in 1959. For more complete details, see Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-
Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 542 at 6 (1960).
11 Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1098 (1905); Croyle
v. Moses, 90 Pa. 250 (1879).
2 Nolt v. Palumbo, 235 Ore. 68, 383 P.2d 1015 (1963).
'
3 Passero v. Loew, 259 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1953).
14 Gilbert v. Corlett, 171 Cal. App. 2d 116, 339 P.2d 960 (1959).
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being equivalent to a lie, 15 or where the vendor took affirmative steps to
conceal a defect. 6 In Herzog v. Capital Co.,17 the vendors sold the vendee
a house through an agent who stated that it was in "sound condition" and
"perfectly intact." The buyer made an inspection of the premises, but
was unable to find any defects since the house had been freshly painted.
Soon after the closing of the transaction the house began to leak severely
during a heavy rain, and on inspection, it was found that the leakage was
the result of defective materials and improper bracing. The court held that
the vendor had a duty to reveal material facts, and although he did not
know of the defects, he was bound by the knowledge and misrepresenta-
tions of his agent. The vendor could not escape liability for the representa-
tions despite the fact that the contract provided that he was bound only
by representations found in the contract itself.'
Another theory on which the courts have seized in order to provide
means to. avoid caveat emptor is to find a duty on the part of the vendor
to divulge information. Many courts find that this duty exists even where
there is no fiduciary relationship, and even though there was, in some
cases, a thorough inspection of the premises by the vendee.19 Although
most courts have applied this duty to disclose on an ad hoc basis, there
are two jurisdictions, Kentucky,20 and California,21 where this duty is
consistently applied and has become the rule.22
The duty to disclose is found in two separate but closely related areas.
15 Where there was an innocent misrepresentation made by the seller courts have
generally not even allowed the buyer to rescind, if the information was equally avail-
able to the buyer. See Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232 (1904); Traverse v. Long,
165 Ohio St. Rptr. 249, 135 N.E.2d 256 (1956); Kalmans v. Powles, 121 Wash. 203,
209 Pac. 5 (1922); Contra: Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1955);
Ham v. Hart, 58 N.M. 550, 273 P.2d 748 (1954).
16 Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga. App. 602, 80 S.E.2d 490 (1954); Beagle v. Bagwell, 169
So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1964); Simmons v. Evans, 185 Tenn. 282, 206 S.W.2d 295 (1947).
17 27 Cal. 2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945). 18 Ibid.
19 See KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW S 250 (4th ed. 1964); Goldfarb, Fraud and Non-
disclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 W. REs. L. REV. 5, 19 (1956).
20 Hall v. Carter, 324 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1959); Bryant v. Troutman, 287 S.W.2d 918
(Ky. 1956); Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1955); Weikel v. Stearnes, 142
Ky. 513, 134 S.W. 908 (1911).
21 In Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963), there is a
lengthy discussion of the rule of nondisclosure in California. See also, Kallgren v.
Steele, 131 Cal. App. 2d 43, 279 P.2d 1027 (1955), Rothstein v. Janns Inv. Corporation,
45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941), Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 551, 112
P.2d 661 (1941).
2 2 The old common law doctrine of caveat elnptor does not apply in Louisiana
where the civil law concept of redhibition allows a seller to avoid a sale because of
a defect in the thing sold. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West 1952). See Gabriel v.
Jeansonne, 162 So. 2d 798 (1964); Perkins v. Chatty 58 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1952).
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The first is where there is a latent material defect known to the seller and
which the buyer will not be able to discover.23 The rationale on which
the courts generally base this exception is the difficulty of discovery by
the vendee so that he is not really dealing on an equal footing with the
vendor.
Typical of this situation is Cohen v. Vivian,24 where plaintiffs, two
elderly women, bought two identical duplexes from defendant. The con-
tracts recited that the purchasers had inspected the property and that they
relied on inspection, not representations of anyone, when entering into
the contract. The houses were, in fact, built upon filled ground, and soon
after the plaintiffs had begun occupancy, the houses began to crack, tilt
and sink. This condition was so dangerous that the plaintiffs had to leave
the premises. The trial court found that the vendor knew that the ground
had been filled and rejected the defendant's contention that caveat emptor
was applicable. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in affirming the judg-
ments for the plaintiffs, did not consider the provision in the contract
regarding inspection as altering liability and stated:
A latent soil defect, known to the seller of a house built on such soil, creates
a duty of disclosure in the seller. His failures to disclose amounts to conceal-
ment, making him vulnerable to a suit based upon fraud. Caveat emptor in
such a case is a pervious shield affording no protection to the seller.25
Some courts have carried this duty on the part of the vendor one step
farther. Although everyone is presumed to know the law, they have im-
posed liability on the vendor for failing to disclose a violation of a local
ordinance. 20 Also, in some cases where the vendor has failed to reveal that
he has used the property unlawfully, the court will grant relief to the
buyer who has suffered loss therefrom.27
The second area where there is a duty to disclose is where there is a
latent defect known to the vendor, and not discoverable by the vendee,
28 Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960); Holley v. Jackson, 39 Del.
Ch. 32, 158 A.2d 803 (1959); Dugan v. Bosco, 34 Del. Ch. 599, 108 A.2d 586 (1954);
Forest Preserve Dist. v. Christopher, 321 111. App. 91, 52 NE.2d 313 (1943). Loghry
v. Capel, 132 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1965); Darque v. Chaput, 166 Neb. 69, 88 N.W.2d
148 (1958); Wolford v. Freeman, 150 Neb. 537, 35 N.W.2d 98 (1948); Jackson v.
Good, 73 N.M. 19, 385 P.2d 279 (1963); Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 253 N.C. 214,
116 S.E.2d 454 (1960); Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934).
24 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960). 25 Id. at 447, 349 P.2d at 367.
26 Curran v. Heslop, 115 Cal. App. 2d 476, 252 P.2d 378 (1953); Milmore v. Dixon,
101 Cal. App. 2d 257, 225 P.2d 272 (1950); Barder v. McClung, 93 Cal. App. 2d 692,
209 P.2d 808 (1949); Gamel v. Lewis, 373 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1963).
2T Burzillo v. Thompson, 57 A.2d 195 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1948); Tucker v. Beazley,
57 A.2d 191 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1948); Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash. 2d 449, 261 P.2d
684 (1948).
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that involves the risk of personal injury.28 Thus in the case of Mei v.
Tsokalas,29 the plaintiff-purchaser brought an action against the seller to
recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff in a fall down the cellar stairway
of her home. The plaintiff alleged that the fall was caused by the handrail
on the stairway which was fastened so closely to the wall that it was im-
possible to hold the rail when using the stairs, and that she fell When her
fingers became stuck in the space between the wall and rail. The plaintiff
based her claim on the fact that this condition amounted to a concealed
defect. The court upheld her contention saying that a vendor of land is
liable for injuries to the seller if he fails to disclose conditions either natural
or artificial which involve an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the
land where he knows of the condition and has reason to believe the buyer
will not discover it.3O
This case was unusual in certain aspects. First, the house was constructed
by the seller for the vendees, and therefore, the plaintiff could have
brought her suit against the builder-vendor for negligence in creating the
condition. Secondly, while a suit for negligence would have more readily
lent itself to recovery under the circumstances here, since the vendor was
the builder, both the plaintiff and court spoke in terms of a latent danger-
ous condition, even though it would appear from the facts as set out that
the condition was not latent but readily discoverable at first sight, or first
touch. While this case illustrates the duty to disclose a latent dangerous
condition, it also serves to illustrate the willingness of some courts today
to turn their back on caveat emptor.
In summing up the areas where there is a duty to disclose, it has been
expressed as follows:
Two propositions are commonly stated: (1) If the material facts are accessible
to the vendor only, and he knows that they are not. known to and are not
within the reach of the diligent attention, observation and judgment of the
plaintiff, the vendor is bound to disclose them; (2) Where the conditions affect
the personal health and safety the vendor's duty is greater than where they
merely affect the value of the property.31
With respect to the duty to disclose, the buyer must be able to make
some showing that the vendor knew of the defect in order to hold him
liable for resulting injuries, since the ordinary vendor (a non-builder) is
not responsible for conditions on the premises which cause injury unless
28 Mei v. Tsokalas, 25 Conn. Sup. 114, 197 A.2d 527 (1961); Bray v. Cross, 98 Ga.
App. 612, 106 S.E.2d 315 (1958); Combow v. Kansas City Ground Inv. Co., 358 Mo.
934, 218 S.W.2d 539 (1949); Belote v. Memphis Development Co., 346 S.W.2d 441
(Tenn. 1961). See also, U.S. v. Inman, 205 E.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953).
29 Mei v. Tsokalas, supra note 28.
80 Ibid. 81 Goldfarb, supra note 19 at 16.
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he knew of them and failed to warn. Therefore, generally speaking, once
the property is sold, the vendor's liability ends. However, this is not the
case where there is a nuisance on the property created by the vendor, the
theory being that the vendor owes a continuing duty to abate it which
survives the sale, or to put it another way, the liability for nuisance sur-
vives the sale.32 Hence, if the purchaser cannot prove that his vendor
knew of the condition, he might still be able to avoid the doctrine of
caveat emptor by proceeding under nuisance. It is of interest to note that
the distinction between dangerous condition and nuisance in this regard
is sometimes vague, since often the nuisance is a dangerous condition.
Therefore, if the vendee, a member of his family, or a guest is injured,
the court will speak of the duty to disclose, while if someone on the right
of way is injured, the vendor might be held to have created a public
nuisance.
In summary, the exceptions to the caveat emptor rule, as previously
enumerated,33 include the following: the duty to disclose latent and mate-
rial defects known to the seller but not within the reach of the buyer; the
duty to disclose conditions which may cause injury; non-disclosure of the
vendor's unlawful use of the property; half-truths and acts of concealment;
and nuisance created by the vendor. It should be kept in mind that despite
these exceptions, the rule which prevails is that there is no liability for
mere nondisclosure unless there was a duty to disclose arising from the
relationship of the parties. The above-mentioned theories are not rigid
propositions. They are merely methods which courts have used in order
to put the parties on a more equal footing, and to avoid caveat emptor.
Moreover, not all jurisdictions are united in applying these theories. There-
fore, despite the fact that the decisions affording the buyer relief where he
has made a bad bargain continue to multiply, in most cases he will still be
out of luck. Although the law in this area is shifting away from the old
maxim,34 as far as the usual transaction between an ordinary buyer and
seller dealing at arms-length, caveat emptor is still a shield for the seller. A
32 Pharm v. Letuchy, 283 N.Y. 130, 27 N.E.2d 811 (1940). Cf. Leahan v. Cochran,
178 Mass. 566, 60 N.E. 328 (1901), wherein the court distinguishes between private
nuisance and public nuisance, holding defendant landowner liable to plaintiff who
was injured on right of way by a nuisance on the land of defendant which nuisance
had been created by his predecessors.
3a Several writers have mentioned another exception to caveat emptor being that
of marketable title, since where there is no agreement to the contrary the vendor of
realty must give marketable title to the- vendee. In effect, then, this would amount
to an implied warranty, but all agreements in the contract are merged in the deed
and therefore, the buyer could only advance this argument where he had accepted a
warranty deed. See Bearman, supra note 10 at 555 and cases cited therein. See also,
Dunham, Vendors obligation as to Fitness of Land For A Particular Purpose, 37 MINN.
L. REv. 108 (1953).
34 5 DE PAUL L. REV. 263 (1956).
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badly battered shield, but nonetheless a shield. In one area, however, the
shield has been pierced, that is, where the seller of the building was also
the one who constructed it.
THE BUILDER-VENDOR-IMPLIED WARRANTY
The liability of a builder who sells a house he is in the process of con-
structing, or who enters into a contract to build a house for a vendee, is
different than that of the ordinary home owner who sells his house to
another. When a builder sells a building not fully completed, there is an
implied warranty which is imposed on him by all construction contracts.
The implied warrantty is that he will use reasonable skill in his work, that
the job will be done in a workmanlike manner and that the building will be
fit for the purpose intended.85 This warranty is an implied one and will,
therefore, be imposed on the builder even if not spelled out in the contract
itself.
This implied warranty or "builder liability" was first established in Miller
v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd.,3 6 wherein a builder-vendor sold a home to a
buyer who entered into the contract of sale before the home was completed.
The vendee subsequently sued the vendor to recover damages for struc-
tural defects. The court held the vendor liable on the basis of an express
warranty which he had made, but stated that he was also liable on an im-
plied warranty that the house was to be built of proper materials and in a
workmanlike manner, and would be fit for habitation.37
This implied warranty, to which the Miller court gave birth, has subse-
quently become the law in a number of jurisdictions.3 8 And although the
common-law courts have generally refused to allow implied warranties
into the sale of realty, only one state has rejected the implied warranty
theory,30 and with the passing of time, it will most likely become the rule
in the vast majority of states. New Jersey, the latest state to accept this
theory,40 had until recently also expressly denied the existence of implied
warranties in the sale of real property.41 Thus in 1957, in Levy v. C. Young
35 KRATOVIL, op. cit. supra note 19 at § 451.
36 [1931] 2 K. B. 113. 37Ibid.
38 Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Col. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A & M Sunrise
Construction Co., 36 I11. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Jose-Balz Co. v. De Witt,
93 Ind. App. 672, 176 N.E. 864 (1932); Loraso v. Custom Built Homes, Inc., 144 So. 2d
459 (La. App. 1962); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965);
Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Jones v. Gate-
wood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Loma Vista Development Co. v. Johnson, 177
S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d
922 (1944); Hoye v. Century Builders Inc. 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
39 Gilbert Construction Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957).
40 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra note 38.
41 Levy v. C. Young Construction Co., 46 N.J. Super 293, 134 A.2d 717 (1957).
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Construction Co.,42 the plaintiff-vendee of a newly constructed house sued
the vendor to recover damages caused by a defective sewerage system.
Despite a vigorous dissent, the court held that absent any express warran-
ties, the doctrine of caveat emptor applied, and the plaintiff could not
recover on an implied warranty.43 The reason behind this decision, as
enunciated by the court, was public policy. It was felt that the cut-off
point of the seller's liability had to be the acceptance of the deed, otherwise
an element of uncertainty would prevail in the field of real estate, with
sellers remaining liable for something that had passed out of their control.
Nevertheless, by 1965, this same court had shifted to the viewpoint of the
Levy dissent and found an implied warranty. 4
Notwithstanding the number of jurisdictions that have adopted the con-
cept of implied warranty laid down in Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd.4n
the reasoning of the Miller court and the extent of the warranty which it
created has become a subject of criticism. 46 The major contention of the
critics is that the purchaser of a house bought one day before completion
may have the protection of an implied warranty, while the man next door,
who bought his house the following day, will not. Despite the fact that the
implied warranty does not, so its critics feel, extend far enough, it almost
goes without saying that as far as the vendee is concerned, some protection
in this area is better than none. In light of the criticism of the implied war-
ranty, it is significant to note that in three states this warranty may extend
to a house which has been completed at the time of the contract.47 How-
ever, it is doubtful if this extension to houses already completed will be-
come very widely accepted, since many of the jurisdictions which have
adopted the implied warranty theory, and even some which have not, have
expressly ruled that the warranty does not arise when the house was com-
pleted at the time of the contract. 48
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra note 38.
45 Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd., supra note 36.
46 KRATOVIL, op. cit. supra note 19 at 309. Bearman, supra note 10 at 545-47.
47 Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Col. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Loraso v. Custom Built
Homes, Inc., supra note 38; Loma Vista Development Co. v. Johnson, supra note 38,
wherein the house still needed minor work, and it was not readily apparent whether
the courts of this state intended to extend the warranty to completed structures.
48 Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Allen v.
Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 237 P.2d 818 (1951); Walton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App. 753, 131
S.E.2d 655 (1963); Coutrakon, v. Adams, 39 I11. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963);
Tudor v. Heugel, 132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961); Staff v. Lido Dunes Inc.,
47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1965). The Appendix which follows this case sets
out the status of the implied warranty in this county and England. Rappich v. Alter-
matt, 106 Ohio App. 282, 151 N.E.2d 253 (1957).
COMMENTS
THE BUILDER-VENDOR AND STRICT LIABILITY
As in the case of the ordinary vendor, if the builder-vendor knows of a
dangerous condition on the premises, he has an affirmative duty to reveal
it.49 The builder-vendor's liability is actually broader than the ordinary
home seller's, since in most cases, he was also the one whose negligence
caused or created the defect or dangerous condition.50 But, as in the case of
the ordinary vendor, the buyer must prove that the seller knew of the con-
dition. In a few jurisdictions, however, this requirement has been side-
stepped. In what may prove to be the most effective restriction yet upon
the doctrine of caveat emptor, some courts have found builder-vendors
liable under the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.5' Thus, if the
house is a "dangerous item" within the meaning of MacPherson, the
builder-vendor will be liable for putting out a defective house which
causes injury. Furthermore, with the requirement of privity no longer
necessary, 52 this liability will not only extend to the vendor's vendee, but
to remote vendees or anyone else who suffers injury as a result of the
defect. So, it seems that with the decision in McPherson, the dragon's teeth
were sewn, and now a host of cases involving real property have sprung up,
each one challenging the sway of the ancient maxim.53
The cases which have applied the law of products liability to builders
have all been of post-World War II vintage. In 1948, in Hale v. Depaoli,54
one of the earliest decisions to apply the rule of MacPherson, the court
found that the plaintiff should have been allowed to go to the jury on her
first count, which alleged the defendant builder was negligent in construc-
tion of a railing which collapsed and injured her. In arriving at this deci-
sion, the court made a radical break with the general rule that a builder
who has completed a house, which has been accepted by the owner, is not
liable for injury to third persons.55 This decision was all the more startling,
49 Mei v. Tsokalas, supra note 28; Bray v. Cross, supra note 28.
50 Ibid. 51217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
52 The cases applying the MacPherson doctrine to builder vendors have not overly
concerned themselves with the concept of privity. For a discussion of privity in the
products liability field, however, see Burns, The Implied Warranty in the Law of
Torts: A New Dimension to Airline Litigation, Trial Law. Guide 115, 115 at n. 2 (1964).
53 Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989
(1956). See also, Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., 176 F.Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1959);
Dow v. Holly Mf. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958); Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.
2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Carter v. Livesay Window Co., 73 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1954);
Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
supra note 38.
54 Hale v. Depaoli supra note 53.
55 See generally, Annot. 58 A.L.R.2d 865 (1956).
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since the railing gave way eighteen years after its construction and was not,
the defendant argued, "imminently dangerous." The court, however, said
the test for liability under the MacPherson doctrine was not "imminent
danger," but whether the object was "reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made.156
In 1954, MacPherson was invoked to allow a mother to recover for the
death of her son when a concrete window frame fell on him.57 The child
did not live in the building, but privity was no longer a prerequisite and the
court held a contractor was liable to third persons, despite the general rule,
if the contractor had created an inherently dangerous condition. 58 In Dow
v. Holly Mfg. Co., 9 a 1958 case, the third vendee in the chain of title was
allowed to recover from the builder-vendor. In 1959, a federal district
court applied MacPherson and held the builder-vendor liable when an em-
ployee in the building was injured. 0 In 1961, in Leigh v. Wadsworth,6 ' the
same rule was applied when a porch roof fell on a tenant of a remote
purchaser.
In Illinois, the court has expressed a willingness to apply the MacPherson
rule to a builder-vendor, and would have held him liable but for the fact
that the injuries to a member of the vendee's family were caused by an
apparent defect.62 However, even this obstacle has now been hurdled. In
speaking of Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc.,6 3 wherein the court
applied the dangerous item test, but was subsequently reversed because the
plaintiff's complaint contained no allegation of a latent defect. The New
Jersey Supreme Court said "[t]his requirement has been the subject of
critical comments which soundly point out that dangers may be unappre-
ciated though patent and risks may be unreasonable though uncon-
cealed."6 4
The New Jersey court, which made this statement in Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons, Inc.,6 5 found for plaintiff on both the theory of implied warranty
and strict liability in what appears to be a landmark case. The plaintiffs
were a young boy and his father who were suing for damages suffered by
the child as a result of a severe scalding from water in the bathroom sink of
56 Hale v. Depaoli, supra note 53 at 232, 201 P.2d at 3.
5 7 Carter v. Livesay Window Co., supra note 53.
58 Ibid. 59 Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., supra note 53.
60 Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., supra note 53. However, this case was reversed.
61 Leigh v. Wadsworth, supra note 53.
62 Kordig v. Northern Constr. Co., 18 I11. App. 2d 48, 151 N.E.2d 470 (1958).
63 Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., supra note 53.
64 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra note 38 at 82, 207 A.2d at 322.
65 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra note 38.
COMMENTS
a house built by defendant. The defendant had not supplied mixing valves
on the faucets in the houses he had built in a mass housing development and
the hot water drawn from the sinks was unusually and excessively hot.
Although the mixing valves were only a few dollars apiece, defendant
omitted them and put a warning in the homeowner's guide instead, explain-
ing the necessity of opening the cold water tap prior to the hot. Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff sued for negligence, pointing out that the
defendant "was not just an ordinary vendor of a house but was also the
architect, the engineer, the planner, the designer, the builder and the con-
tractor."6 6 In a second count, the plaintiffs asked that the defendant be held
liable for breach of a warranty of habitability. The court held that the
plaintiffs could rely on both counts and speaking of the defendant, stated
that "[iln this respect it was not unlike the manufacturers of automobiles,
airplanes, etc., whose products embody parts supplied by others. When
their marketed products are defective and cause injury to either immediate
or remote users, such manufacturers may be held accountable under ordi-
nary negligence principles."6 7
Thus, it can be seen by the slow but steadily developing number of
cases, that a new area of law is gradually unfolding. Whether or not it will
be incorporated into the developing field of products liability,68 or whether
the cases dealing with real property will grow into a separate but parallel
area of law, remains to be seen. Whatever its eventual status, this is an
area alive with possibilities, as illustrated by one commentator who specu-
lates:
The extension of the MacPherson theory to realty in effect places upon the
builder-vendor an implied warranty against structural defects upon which the
vendee can sue should injury occur because of the defects. It would not seem
too great a step for future courts to take, to reason that if such a "warranty"
exists when an injury has occurred, there is no reason to say that it does not
exist when the vendee sues his vendor who is also the builder, not to redress
an injury, but simply to establish the structural quality and good workmanship
in his house, the lack of which may lead to injury at some later time. For this
reason, the black-letter law to the effect that there are no implied warranties
of quality in the sale of a new house is most likely to fall in the situation in
which the vendor of the house is also its builder.69
CONCLUSION
It is more than readily apparent that the trend today is to limit caveat
emptor wherever possible. This is so obvious that it does not even warrant
66 Id. at 80. 207 A.2d at 320. 67 Ibid.
68 See generally, PROSSER, TORTS § 97 (3rd ed. 1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
69 Bearman, supra note 10 at 57.
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mentioning. Moreover, in the last two decades, courts and writers have
continued to report this trend70 while conceding that the law is still what it
has been for the past century.71 What is of significance, however, is the
recent shape this trend is taking. It is branching off into two separate areas
of exceptions to caveat emptor; one for the ordinary person selling his
home or building, and the other applied where the vendor is the builder.
This divergence seems desirable. The doctrine of caveat emptor arose when
men dealt on an equal footing, and even today, when a buyer deals with the
average homeowner, despite the difficulty of making a thorough examina-
tion of the premises, the positions are not grossly unequal. The old doctrine
is not necessarily undesirable or primitive under these circumstances. On
the other hand, where the buyer deals with a construction company which
erects scores of homes a year, he is, as it were, standing in a ravine. Here,
the imposition of implied warranties and strict liability will help once more
to raise the buyer to the same level as the seller, and pierce the shield of
caveat emptor.72
Eric Cahan
70 Goldfarb, supra note 19; Bearman, supra note 10; 5 DE PAUL L. REv. 263 (1956).
71 Goldfarb, supra note 19 at 43. See generally, Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960,
38 TEx. L. REv. 439 (1960).
72 Although it may be harsh to hold the builder liable where he can no longer exer-
cise control over the building, as between him and the innocent vendee, he is far
better able to shoulder the burden. Perhaps one of the underlying reasons for the
recent applications of implied warrantees and strict liability upon the builder is re-
vealed by the Scbipper Court which stated: "There is presumably available to such
modern entrepreneurs, as there is in the products liability field generally, wholly
adequate extended insurance coverage and the builder vendors are admittedly in a
much better economic position than the injured party to absorb crippling losses caused
by their own negligence or defective construction." (Schipper v. Levitt, supra note
38 at 87, 207 A.2d at 323.)
